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ABSTRACT 
Mandate impossible: Mediation and the 




This article explores former President Joaquim Chissano’s mediation in 
Madagascar after the 2009 political crisis that led to the ouster of President 
Marc Ravalomanana. It shows that there are inherent tensions in mediating 
the reestablishment of constitutional order in the context of the African Union’s 
anti-coup policy. While espousing the ideal of mediation as an inclusive and 
locally owned process, Chissano’s mandate contradicted both the realities on 
the ground and the prescriptions of the AU’s anti-coup policy. The article 
analyzes the norms and principles inscribed in this mandate and their 
ambiguous translation into practice. The analysis offers inroads into 
understanding the normative and practical dilemmas of mediation in the 
context of unconstitutional changes of government. 
 
Introduction 
On June 20, 2009, the Summit of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) appointed Mozambique’s former president Joaquim 
Chissano as chief mediator for a political crisis that had erupted in 
Madagascar. Three months previously, the Malagasy President Marc 
Ravalomanana had been ousted from power after months of public protest in 
the island’s capital, Antananarivo. A military committee had then installed 
Andry Rajoelina, the former mayor of Antananarivo, as “President of the 
Transition.”1 As Ravalomanana fled into exile, Rajoelina promised fundamental 
reforms and new elections. SADC and numerous other regional and 
international organizations, including the African Union (AU), called for the 
rapid restoration of constitutional order. This was in line with the AU’s anti-
coup policy, promulgated in the Lomé Declaration, which prohibits 
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governments that come to power unconstitutionally from participating in the 
organization and mandates the AU to ensure that constitutional order is 
restored.2 
In order to achieve this in Madagascar, the SADC Summit mandated Chissano 
to “create a conducive environment for a productive and successful dialogue” 
between Malagasy “stakeholders” and to “ensure that the Malagasy people 
take full ownership of the process.”3 The mediator was expected to finalize the 
work upon “the completion of the inclusive dialogue and holding of the general 
elections in Madagascar.”4 Yet reestablishing constitutional order in 
Madagascar took almost five years. It involved several rounds of negotiations, 
agreements that were signed and reneged on, sanctions applied against 
individuals, and legislative and presidential elections that in early 2014 finally 
marked the restoration of constitutional order. 
That this process took much longer than initially expected is often attributed to 
the lack of coherence between the numerous international actors that came to 
“assist” Madagascar’s return to constitutional order. Madagascar, so the 
argument goes, reflected the “crowded field” of international mediation.5 While 
this observation is apt, I seek to show that it does not explain adequately why 
mediation turned out to be so difficult. I use Chissano’s mandate as my 
analytical focus in order to show that there are inherent tensions in the idea 
of mediating the restoration of constitutional order in the context of the AU’s 
anti-coup policy. 
Chissano’s mandate expressed the ideals of mediation understood as a 
voluntary, consensual, and inclusive process owned by the parties 
themselves, which the impartial mediator assists.6 This mandate contradicted 
both the realities on the ground and the AU’s anti-coup policy. The SADC 
summit thus created a mandate that was impossible to realize. Firstly, the 
mediation had no invitation from the Malagasy parties. The mediators were 
thus forced to find “stakeholders” who they could assist and who were willing 
to compromise, which contradicts the idea that the mediation team was a 
facilitator and the process was locally owned. Secondly, the ultimate aim of the 
process (elections), the path (negotiations), and the time frame (as short as 
possible) were predetermined before the mediation started, contradicting the 
ideal of an open process owned by the parties themselves. As I show, this 
meant that the mediators acted rather as negotiators and sometimes even 
resorted to coercive measures in order to ensure the rapid restoration of 
constitutional order. This closed the space for actual mediation and the search 
for political solutions to the crisis beyond elections. It also exposed the 
mediation to criticism because it failed to implement its own ideals. 
This argument is based on primary documents and interviews that I conducted 
in 2014 during a five-month research visit to Antananarivo, Gaborone, 
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Pretoria, and Johannesburg and during earlier research at the AU 
headquarters in Addis Ababa. 
The following section summarizes the international efforts to reestablish 
constitutional order in Madagascar. The third section describes the multiple 
sources of Chissano’s mandate. The fourth section scrutinizes the two 
contradictions that made “mediating” the return to constitutional order in 
Madagascar difficult: the fact that the mediation team had no mandate from 
the “stakeholders” it was meant to assist; and the contradiction within 
Chissano’s mandate between a policy on unconstitutional changes of 
government on one hand and the claim that the mediator would help Malagasy 
“stakeholders” find their own solution to the crisis on the other. 
Restoring constitutional order in Madagascar 
In March 2009 the AU, SADC, and other international actors immediately 
condemned the ousting of Ravalomanana as an unconstitutional change of 
government and demanded the rapid restoration of constitutional order.7 Within 
days, four special envoys representing various organizations arrived in 
Antananarivo: Tiébilé Dramé (UN), Ablassé Ouédraogo (AU), Edem Kodjo 
(Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, OIF), and Themba Absalom 
Dlamini (SADC). On April 30, 2009, the International Contact Group on 
Madagascar (ICG-M) was set up to facilitate coordination between the 
international actors. However, these actors strongly disagreed on how they 
interpreted the situation and what exactly to demand from the Malagasy 
parties. While all requested a return to constitutional order, it was unclear what 
exactly this entailed. 
SADC sided with Ravalomanana, demanded his reinstallation, and even 
threatened to consider “other options to restore constitutional normalcy.”8 The 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) demanded the 
examination of “all options, including the possibility of military intervention.”9 In 
Madagascar, both decisions were perceived as a threat to use military force to 
reinstall Ravalomanana. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
demanded that the Chairperson of the AU Commission “work closely with 
SADC and AU partners… to contribute to the rapid restoration of constitutional 
order.”10 The AU preferred a mediated solution but was bound by its policy 
framework on unconstitutional changes of government. The UN was more 
flexible, yet also insisted on a mediated solution.11 The US, despite having 
been a crucial supporter of Ravalomanana, endorsed the idea of transitional 
elections. In contrast, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard 
Kouchner, called the situation a popular coup d’état.12 The French government 
nevertheless considered the dissolution of the parliament unconstitutional and 
demanded that Rajoelina organize elections as soon as possible.13 This 
dissonance also manifested itself among the four special envoys who were 
sent to Antananarivo. They promoted different formats for the negotiations and 
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apparently sent different signals to the leaders of the Malagasy negotiation 
parties.14 
Despite these disagreements, however, the various international efforts to 
reestablish constitutional order soon converged on the idea that a negotiated 
power-sharing deal and elections were required to resolve the crisis. To break 
the confrontational atmosphere between the pro-Ravalomanana and pro-
Rajoelina camps, the mediators decided that negotiations should include the 
so-called four mouvances (quatre mouvances) representing Ravalomanana, 
Rajoelina, and the two former presidents, Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. 
Several rounds of negotiation were held in Antananarivo, without tangible 
result. 
In June 2009, SADC appointed Chissano as lead mediator to create a 
“conducive environment for a productive and successful dialogue.”15 On 
August 8, 2009, Chissano facilitated the signing of the Maputo Accords in 
which the mouvances agreed to establish a government of national unity and 
organize elections within 15 months. But the accords left open—or deliberately 
vague—questions relating to the division of cabinet posts, the role of Rajoelina 
during the transition, and eligibility to stand for elections.16 Two more rounds of 
negotiations were organized, one in Maputo and the other in Addis Ababa. 
However, despite the mouvances’ stated commitment to a “neutral, inclusive, 
civil, and consensual” transition, consensus remained elusive. As summarized 
by Ratsiraka, “Nous nous chamaillions comme des gosses,” or, “We were 
quarreling like kids.”17 The envisaged power-sharing deal soon broke down. 
In mid-December 2009 Rajoelina announced that the time to negotiate was 
over and that Madagascar’s transition had to take place without further lengthy 
debates. In reaction, the AU PSC decided to apply targeted sanctions against 
109 members of the coup regime, known as the HAT (Haute autorité de 
transition).18 The international demand for a “consensual and inclusive 
transitional period” and an “inclusive, transparent and credible dialogue” was 
nevertheless reiterated, as was Chissano’s mandate to facilitate the process.19 
After a series of failed negotiations under the auspices of the AU, South Africa, 
and France, on September 17, 2011, Chissano and his mediation team 
facilitated the signing of the SADC Roadmap for Ending the Crisis. The 
Roadmap confirmed Rajoelina as president of the transition, established inter 
alia a government of national unity and two legislative organs, and defined 
preconditions for the holding of transitional elections.20 The signatories to this 
agreement were eight political parties and the mouvances of Zafy and 
Ravalomanana. 
Following a turbulent transition, presidential and legislative elections were 
finally held in October and December 2013. The presidential election was won 
by Hery Rajaonarimampianina, who had run as Rajoelina’s candidate. Despite 
a contentious electoral process and an initial call by the Ravalomanana camp 
not to accept the results, Rajaonarimampianina’s victory was soon recognized 
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by his rivals and internationally. Thus, for the AU and SADC, constitutional 
order was successfully reestablished. 
The mandates to mediate 
The multiplicity of competing international mediators and interests involved in 
the crisis in Madagascar has rightly been interpreted as an illustration of a new 
complexity in international mediation.21 However, what made the mediation 
difficult was not only the diverging interests of and institutional competition 
between international actors but that the ideals and principles set out in the 
mediator’s mandate—that he would facilitate an open and inclusive process 
owned by the Malagasies themselves—were at odds with both the realities on 
the ground and the prescriptions of the AU’s anti-coup policy. This also 
widened the gap between the official rhetoric and the actual practices and 
caused the mediation to be contested. A closer look at Chissano’s multiple 
mandates sheds light on the norms and principles on which his efforts were 
based and shows the extent to which, and with what consequences, these 
norms and principles became obstacles in practice.22 
Chissano’s appointment was made in the context of SADC’s 2001 Protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The constitutional mandate thus 
stemmed from the protocol’s Article 11(2), which stipulates that in cases of “a 
military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a State” the SADC 
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security may seek to resolve the 
conflict.23 This constitutional mandate was the basis on which the SADC 
Summit appointed Chissano as mediator. 
Chissano’s mediation was also approved by the PSC, which welcomed his 
work as chief mediator, although it claimed that the mediation would take place 
“under the auspices of the African Union.”24 Even though Chissano had been 
appointed by SADC, the AU sought to retain its role as the guardian of 
continental peace, security, and democracy. The PSC continued to monitor the 
situation, Chissano was invited to brief the PSC and the AU Assembly, and the 
mandate of the AU special envoy was not renewed. When the mediation 
stalled, AU Chairperson Jean Ping and AU Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra 
traveled to Madagascar to convey the decisions taken by the PSC and the 
ICG-M. For the AU, the constitutional mandate also derived from the AU’s anti-
coup policy, which had been introduced in the Lomé Declaration of 2000 and 
was later affirmed in the AU’s Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council.25 As mentioned, this policy 
condemns the unconstitutional takeover of power as an “anachronistic act” and 
mandates the AU to “facilitate the restoration of constitutional order” as quickly 
as possible.26 
The normative mandate underpinning the mediation efforts in Madagascar 
derived from a variety of SADC and AU policies. The Lomé Declaration does 
not offer details on what the restoration of constitutional order means in 
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practice but refers in general terms to the promotion of democracy, the rule of 
law, and the people’s right to choose their government.27 The 2007 African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance extends the Lomé 
Declaration by prohibiting the “perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of 
government” from participating in transitional elections, thus setting procedural 
standards for the reestablishment of constitutional order.28 The SADC protocol 
in turn is not explicit about how the “threat to the legitimate authority of a 
State”29 should be addressed but lists as SADC objectives the promotion of 
human rights and democratic institutions and practices.30 
Chissano’s political mandate came in the first instance from the SADC 
Summit.31 The mandate was to “lead and coordinate the all-party dialogue in 
Madagascar.”32 More specifically, Chissano’s terms of reference requested him 
to create a “conducive environment for a productive and successful dialogue” 
and to “encourage the Malagasy stakeholders to take the lead of the inclusive 
dialogue and work to ensure that the Malagasy people take full ownership of 
the process.”33 Moreover, it was stated that the “work of the SADC Facilitator 
should be finalized upon completion of the inclusive dialogue and holding of 
the general elections in Madagascar.”34 In 2010, after Rajoelina and the HAT 
reneged on the Maputo and Addis Ababa agreements, the SADC Summit 
once again requested Chissano to “continue with efforts towards restoration of 
constitutional order in Madagascar, through an inclusive, transparent and 
credible dialogue.”35 The AU PSC and the ICG-M backed the political mandate 
by monitoring the situation, keeping up political pressure, delineating red lines, 
and garnering support for SADC and Chissano.36 While in some regards the 
PSC, the ICG-M, and the SADC Summit held different positions, they all 
converged in supporting Chissano’s efforts to forge a consensual and inclusive 
solution to the crisis.37 
Chissano’s political mandate thus clearly expressed both the general ideal of 
mediation as an inclusive, consensual, and locally owned process and the 
broader norms of the AU and SADC for addressing unconstitutional changes 
of government. In doing so, however, it contained two obvious contradictions. 
First, despite the instruction to Chissano to “lead and coordinate the all-party 
dialogue in Madagascar,”38 there was no mandate from the parties themselves. 
So what had instigated Chissano’s mediation was not a request from the 
“stakeholders” themselves but rather the constitutional provisions and policies 
of the African organizations.39 
Second, in line with the AU’s anti-coup policy, the political mandate defined the 
ultimate goal of the mediation as the restoration of constitutional order through 
the organization of elections and determined that this should be achieved as 
quickly as possible. This contradicted the stated aim of Malagasy ownership of 
the course and content of the process. That both the ultimate end and the time 
frame were already set is reflected not only in Chissano’s official terms of 
reference but also in the various SADC, AU, and ICG-M resolutions and 
statements. In December 2009 the PSC reiterated its demand for a “rapid 
restoration of constitutional order”40 and stated that the aim of the international 
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efforts would be “to meet the conditions for the successful holding of legislative 
and presidential elections, which will mark the end of the crisis.”41 The ICG-M 
decided that to reestablish constitutional order, Malagasy political actors 
should work for a transition “as short as possible,” which “should enable the 
organization, in a consensual and inclusive manner, of elections that are free, 
credible, and transparent.”42 
Consequently, the political mandate contained a certain ambiguity regarding 
the extent to which Malagasies were actually meant to own the process. This 
was reflected in the wording of the SADC Summit decisions and Chissano’s 
terms of reference. On the one hand, these documents refer to ownership and 
dialogue as key principles for resolving the crisis. They say that “the ownership 
of the political dialogue in Madagascar must lie with the Malagasy people 
themselves.”43 On the other hand, they also place leadership of the dialogue in 
the hands of the mediator, who ultimately has to “ensure that it is a success, in 
line with his mandate.”44 The problems resulting from this self-initiated and 
prescriptive mediation are discussed in the following section. 
Tensions in “mediating” the return to constitutional order 
When Chissano arrived in Antananarivo for the first time, he was certainly not 
“undermandated.” Rather, the directive to rapidly restore constitutional order 
through elections and a “consensual, inclusive and transparent 
dialogue”45 owned by Malagasies themselves set the bar high for what 
“mediation” should achieve. This section discusses the two tensions implicitly 
contained in this mandate as well as their consequences that became evident 
when the mandate was translated into practice. 
Mediation without invitation 
The first tension in Chissano’s mandate stemmed from the fact that while it 
spoke about “stakeholders” who ought to be assisted by the mediator, these 
“stakeholders” did not instigate and invite the mediation in the first place. They 
were not the ones who had requested mediation, but they became the 
“stakeholders” because of the international demand to organize an inclusive 
dialogue. Yet rather than agreeing on a transitional power-sharing 
arrangement, the four mouvances used the negotiations to promote their 
individual claims to power. This rendered both “mediation” and agreement at 
the table futile. 
The rationale for inviting the four mouvances to the negotiations was that this 
would give the process more legitimacy and credibility. Moreover, the 
Ratsiraka and Zafy mouvances were expected to break the stalemate between 
the main protagonists, Rajoelina and Ravalomanana, and serve as facilitators 
between them.46 This choice reflected Chissano’s mandate to create an 
inclusive and comprehensive process owned by Malagasies themselves. The 
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result, however, was the creation of negotiation parties that were neither able 
nor willing to carry out the required role of organizers of an inclusive and 
neutral transition process. 
The four mouvances were in fact inventions of the mediation process. None of 
them had existed as such before. While the mouvances of the three former 
presidents—Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy—were founded on their 
leaders’ respective party structures, they also drew opportunists into their 
ranks. For all of them, it was unclear who actually belonged to the mouvance 
and how the mouvance related to the existing political parties. This ultimately 
meant that the mouvances turned into arenas of internal competition for power 
and prestige. As one interviewee said, within the mouvance Zafy “tout le 
monde veut être calife à la place du calife” (“everyone wants to take the 
leader’s place”), pointing to members’ competition and intrigues in order to 
access or secure power.47 
As a result, the mouvances were fairly volatile internally. This was most 
obviously the case with the one led by Rajoelina, which reflected the 
spontaneous and heterogeneous “coalition of circumstances” that had 
characterized the anti-Ravalomanana movement.48 One participant in the 
Maputo negotiations described this tendency as follows: 
The problem was Mr. Rajoelina, who was under the influence of the members 
of his mouvance. When we met among the four of us, he accepted, but when 
we reunited in plenary he renounced from the concessions he had made. This 
is how he differed from Mr. Ratsiraka or Mr. Ravalomanana: when they 
decided, the other members of their mouvances followed. For him [Rajoelina] it 
was the opposite. He was under the influence of the members of his 
mouvance.49 
The internal incoherence and uncertainty forced Rajoelina on several 
occasions to make sudden reversals, complicating the negotiations. Zafy’s 
minutes from the early rounds of the negotiations held in Antananarivo paint a 
similar picture. Here, for instance, Rajoelina’s delegation was divided on how 
to determine the scope and substance of an amnesty arrangement. This was 
one of the reasons for postponing the negotiations.50 Internal incoherence was 
also a problem within Ravalomanana’s mouvance. Ravalomanana was in exile 
in South Africa, so the question of who actually represented his mouvance in 
Antananarivo regularly caused confusion for both the mouvance and the 
mediator.51 
The four mouvances also lacked the material and non-material resources 
required to fulfill the externally expected role of negotiating Madagascar’s 
political future. Apart from the former presidents, only a few members of the 
mouvances had experience in diplomacy and international negotiation. On the 
one hand, this often meant that agreements were reneged on, and an overall 
high degree of uncertainty prevailed during the negotiations.52 On the other, it 
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cemented internal hierarchies and placed extraordinary importance on the 
leaders of each mouvance. 
The concentration on the chefs de file (party leaders) was also reflected in the 
mouvances’ respective positions at the negotiation table. All four were 
distinguished more by their leaders’ rivalries and alliances than by broader 
political visions. This is not to say that the mouvances did not have particular 
themes that shaped their respective contributions. However, it emphasizes 
how limited the scope of the negotiations actually was. Zafy focused on 
promoting his long-elaborated ideas on national reconciliation.53 Ratsiraka 
stressed the importance of revising the constitution, decentralization, and 
amnesty provisions, this last being an issue that mattered for him 
personally.54 Ravalomanana’s mouvance focused on his return to Madagascar, 
compensation for the destruction of his personal fortune during the protests in 
early 2009, amnesty, and the release of those imprisoned since 
2009.55 Rajoelina focused mainly on being recognized as president of the 
transition and on preventing Ravalomanana’s return, which he portrayed as 
conditions for realizing the once promised political renewal.56 
These examples show that the issues and priorities that the mouvances 
brought to the negotiations reflected the individual strategies and interests of 
their respective leaders rather than tangible programs for the political, social, 
or economic (re)organization of Madagascar. The mouvances thus diverged 
from the ideal of coherent, committed, and legitimate negotiation parties with 
clear interests in formulating a transitional program and organizing elections. 
The international demand for an inclusive, transparent, and credible dialogue 
had, contrary to the intentions of the AU and SADC, resulted in negotiations 
that the “stakeholders” used to advance personal interests in a zero-sum 
game. This caused new tensions within and between the four parties and 
called into question whether this was actually a dialogue owned by the 
Malagasy parties. In the eyes of many Malagasies, the tensions compromised 
the legitimacy of not only the parties but also the whole mediation process, 
which seemed to perpetuate rather than diminish intra-elite conflict and 
exacerbate the political crisis.57 
Incongruity within the mandate 
The second tension in Chissano’s mandate stemmed from the contradiction 
between the ideal of a locally owned dialogue and the predetermined goal and 
path that the restoration of constitutional order was supposed to take. The 
prescription to restore constitutional order as quickly as possible and to do so 
by organizing elections contradicted the claim that the Malagasies would find 
their own path to resolve the political crisis through open dialogue. 
The UN defines mediation as “a process whereby a third party assists two or 
more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by 
helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements.”58 A mediator is thus 
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ideally an impartial third party who helps the conflict parties find a joint 
solution.59 This process is supposed to be voluntary, consensual, and non-
binding.60 However, since the AU and SADC had decided in 
advance how constitutional order should be reestablished, this image of an 
impartial third party and its role of assisting negotiations was at odds with the 
mediator’s role in practice. Rather than facilitating dialogue between the 
Malagasy parties, the prescriptions of the Lomé Declaration forced the AU and 
SADC to find Malagasy partners who were willing and able to realize the 
required “credible, inclusive, consensual and neutral” transition. 
The role of the mediator also gradually shifted toward that of a negotiator. Or, 
put differently, rather than mediating between the Malagasy parties, Chissano 
and his team were forced to mediate between the international actors who 
demanded that constitutional order be restored as quickly as possible, and the 
various Malagasy parties who resisted following suit. Two examples serve to 
illustrate how this incongruity within the mandate played out in practice. 
First, over the course of time, international efforts were increasingly reduced to 
formulating a transitional roadmap and organizing elections as soon as 
possible rather than facilitating dialogue between the Malagasies. In August 
2010, Chissano noted that it was unclear “how those who unlawfully maintain 
power under the leadership of Mr. Rajoelina will be involved in the process of 
negotiations, so that they can ensure the implementation of the signed 
agreements.”61 The negotiations were stalled, and getting Rajoelina to 
compromise seemed particularly elusive. Chissano thus concluded that it was 
necessary to broaden participation “to include other stakeholders beyond the 
Mouvances” and make a “strategic adjustment in the mediation 
approach.”62 The mediators thus looked for other partners willing to implement 
the required inclusive transition. 
In the course of preparing the 2011 SADC Roadmap, Chissano’s envoy 
Leonardo Simão consequently consulted a much larger number of 
“stakeholders”—leaders of old or recently established political parties—in 
order to assemble a broad group willing to sign and implement the transitional 
roadmap. In a letter to the mouvances, Simão noted that the mediation was 
“compelled to accept … new political actors.”63 He nevertheless confirmed that 
the Chefs de File de Mouvances do have a role to play… . For the time being, 
the mediation prefers a negotiation process mostly based on informal 
exchanges with members of the delegations of the Mouvances, political parties 
and groups, as well as other political stakeholders.64 
Although this meant a more inclusive process, the mediation had dwindled to 
mere consultations. Dialogue among the parties was mostly absent. As 
stipulated by Chissano, the aim was to find partners to sign and implement a 
transitional agreement, not to engage in more dialogue. 
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Despite regular consultations every time the mediation team visited 
Antananarivo, none of these led to substantial changes in the draft 
Roadmap.65 This particularly reflects the experiences of the mouvances, whom 
the mediation team still wanted to keep in the process. Ravalomanana, for 
instance, complained to the SADC Summit that his meeting with Chissano in 
early March 2011 had not truly been meant to consider any of his proposals: 
Contrary to what Mouvance Ravalomanana leaders in Madagascar were told 
by Minister Simao, President Chissano was not prepared to receive any further 
representations from Mouvance Ravalomanana. He advised President 
Ravalomanana that the process was closed and that if he did not initial the 
Roadmap that had been agreed to by other Malagasy Political Actors on 9 
March 2011, Mouvance Ravalomanana would be excluded from the 
Transitional government.66 
Even those parties that were favorably disposed toward the proposed 
Roadmap observed that consultations played a role but rarely led to 
substantial change.67 As one participant observed: 
Every time when he [the mediator] arrived, he consulted everyone. But there 
were never direct dialogues between the parties. Never. But you enter [the 
room], they collect your ideas. The 11 entities [the parties meant to sign the 
Roadmap] enter one after the other. He collects their ideas. After this: they 
formulate theirs. And they say: “Voila, the results of the consultations.” All the 
consultations were just a façade. It had already been written.68 
Many of the parties felt pressured to sign the Roadmap if they did not want to 
be left out of the transition.69 The focus on securing signatures rather than 
mediating also meant that those not willing to follow suit were increasingly 
marginalized and even publicly delegitimated. This was particularly true of the 
encounters with Ratsiraka, Zafy, and Ravalomanana, as reflected in 
Ravalomanana’s complaint, who were now forced to either adapt to the new 
circumstances or accept being left out. In a meeting with the three former 
presidents, Simão advised them to accept “the practical formula: that is 
elections for the Malagasies and for the international community” and 
suggested that they should “be practical.”70 To increase the political and moral 
pressure, SADC and the AU also regularly denounced attempts to undermine 
the Roadmap as endangering the interests of the nation.71 
The second example illustrating the incongruity within the mandate is that the 
mediators resorted to coercive measures in order to “ensure that it is a 
success.”72 One such measure was the concerted international effort to 
prevent Rajoelina from standing for presidential elections. After the signing of 
the 2011 Roadmap, the unresolved issues were the circumstances under 
which Ravalomanana would be allowed to return to Madagascar and the 
question of who was eligible to run in presidential elections. The mediators 
were faced with a dilemma: letting Rajoelina contest the elections would 
violate the prescriptions of the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and 
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Governance, yet the rapid restoration of constitutional order was only possible 
with Rajoelina’s support, and this in turn was based on the precondition that 
Ravalomanana would not return to Madagascar. 
In late 2012, Rajoelina and Ravalomanana agreed to the so-called “ni-ni” 
solution, which meant that neither leader would run in the presidential 
elections. Yet in May 2013 Rajoelina filed his candidacy, which he justified by 
pointing out that Ravalomanana’s wife Lalao had also filed her candidacy, as 
had former President Ratsiraka. The candidatures of all three caused a 
diplomatic outrage. The AU PSC, the SADC Summit, and the ICG-M 
condemned Rajoelina’s reneging on the “ni-ni” principle and pointed out that 
Lalao Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka were infringing the condition of residency 
enshrined in the electoral law. All three were denounced as “illegitimate 
candidacies.”73 The ICG-M threatened that the “international community would 
not recognize the Malagasy authorities elected in violation of the relevant 
decisions of both the AU and SADC.”74 The group also recommended that 
Madagascar’s international partners who had “made contributions or pledges 
to the electoral process” should “make the necessary arrangements 
temporarily to freeze such support” and encouraged the international 
community “to consider applying robust, targeted sanctions against all 
Malagasy stakeholders undermining the smooth running of the electoral 
process and the full implementation of the Roadmap.”75 
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra traveled to 
Antananarivo to present the so-called 7-Point-Plan that the ICG-M had 
adopted. The plan foresaw that Rajoelina should dismantle the special 
electoral court (cour électorale spéciale, CES) that had accepted the three 
candidatures, while a newly composed court should present a new list.76 This 
was incentivized by the promise that “the restoration of constitutional order 
would enable Madagascar to benefit from an increased support through 
international cooperation.”77 A lack of both money and international recognition 
for transitional elections, combined with the growing pressure to expand the 
list for targeted sanctions against members of the HAT, finally turned the 
course of the transition: Rajoelina bowed to the international pressure and 
dismantled the CES. A new list, without the three names, was announced. The 
external intervention sparked fierce criticism in Madagascar. The 7-Point-Plan 
was called “the seven commandments”78 that prevented Malagasy ownership 
of the process. 
The preceding discussion shows that the possibility of actual mediation was 
impeded by the incongruity between the required inclusive dialogue owned by 
Malagasies on one hand and the predetermined goal of rapidly reestablishing 
constitutional order through elections on the other. The individual consultations 
(as opposed to setting up a forum for direct negotiations), the focus on 
signatures and “conclusion” rather than dialogue, and the resort to coercive 
measures all curtailed the content of what was negotiated and consequently 
narrowed down the negotiation of post-coup order in Madagascar to the 
13 
 
question of by whom and how quickly transitional elections could be 
organized. 
This was especially evident to nongovernmental organizations, the Malagasy 
churches, and others who tried in vain to suggest alternatives or warn the 
international mediators that after such a half-hearted transition the conditions 
for organizing free and fair elections were not yet in place.79 Their efforts to 
address questions of reconciliation, constitutional reform, and voter education, 
for instance, were rejected by the AU and SADC as illegitimate and against the 
national will.80 The incongruity in the mandate thus meant that the predefined 
goal and the time pressure to succeed severely limited the amount of 
inclusivity and dialogue the mediation was actually able to support. 
Conclusion 
Mandates are crucial in professionalizing mediation. A mandate is supposed to 
state a mission’s aims and hence render it transparent. It is meant to endow 
the mediator with authority and legitimacy and thus increase the chances of 
success. A clear mandate should also make it easier to assess whether a 
mediation has succeeded in realizing what it was set up to achieve.81 
The Madagascar case demonstrates how a mandate can, on the other hand, 
be a hindrance. It shows that a mandate that is impossible to translate into 
practice can obstruct a mediation. The difficulty in realizing the mandate in this 
case was not just because of multiple and competing mediators, diverging 
international interests, or the mediator’s erroneous decisions or flawed 
strategies. It was also due to inherent contradictions in trying to mediate a 
return to constitutional order in the context of the AU’s anti-coup policy. First, 
contrary to the ideals of mediation, this mandate came not from the parties but 
from the AU and SADC constitutional acts and policy frameworks. And 
second, also contrary to the ideals of mediation, the goals and the path of the 
mediation were predetermined, with the reestablishment of constitutional order 
being equated with organizing elections as quickly as possible. 
The problem with the mandate was hence not that it was badly or only partially 
implemented but that it was impossible to realize because its principles and 
underlying assumptions were in contradiction with one another and with the 
realities on the ground. This made the effort to reestablish constitutional order 
a long and cumbersome process because the mediators had to find 
“stakeholders” willing to implement the internationally demanded inclusive and 
neutral transition. It also meant that the actual practices increasingly diverged 
from the proclaimed locally owned dialogue in search of a solution to the crisis. 
As one interviewee put it: 
It has to be said that they [the mediators] did not have an objective. For them 
the objective was to get to elections. It was that. It was an obsession… . As if 
elections would suddenly resolve all problems… . Everyone wanted to get to 
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elections. But how to get there? Which steps to take? Which preconditions 
need to be fulfilled? And what would elections lead to?82 
The gap between officially upheld ideals and actual practice endangered the 
legitimacy of the mediation and exposed it to contestation. It encouraged 
deception and caused frustration on the part of those who were not party to 
the transitional plan and on the part of those who tried to promote alternatives. 
In May 2013, the Malagasy churches ended their own national dialogue with a 
simple yet powerful conclusion: that another transition was necessary in order 
to address all those questions that the international mediation had so far 
glossed over.83 But the drive to restore constitutional order through transitional 
elections as quickly as possible proved stronger. That this was not quite a 
process in which “the Malagasy people” took “full ownership” was more than 
evident. Against this background it is not surprising that 18.7 percent of the 
respondents in the 2015 Afrobarometer survey said that SADC had done 
nothing to help Madagascar, and 29.3 percent that it had helped only a 
little.84 For the AU the figures were similar: 15.9 percent said the AU had done 
nothing to help Madagascar, and 28.4 percent said that it had helped only a 
little. Only 15 percent and 17 percent, respectively, said that SADC and the AU 
had helped a lot. 
Mandates are thus an important lens for analyzing the politics of the AU’s anti-
coup policy. In this sense, the Madagascar case revealed the tensions 
between the claim to mediate based on local ownership and dialogue and the 
AU’s policy on unconstitutional changes of government. Analyzing the way that 
ideal mandates are translated into practice can help us understand the 
normative and practical dilemmas involved in “mediating” the reestablishment 
of constitutional order. This article has considered only one case, but recent 
experiences in Burkina Faso and Mali, for instance, suggest similar dynamics 
to those described here. What the mediators and “stakeholders” in those 
cases made of the political mandates would be worth exploring. 
In the academic literature, international mediation has been described in much 
less ideal terms. It has been noted that mediators are interested actors, that 
they use power and sometimes coercion, that they negotiate rather than 
merely facilitate, and that they have a mandate to promote predetermined 
norms and principles that may run counter to those held by the 
parties.85 James Ker-Lindsay has argued that in the international sphere, 
“traditional mediation practices” have given way to “a new, more active form of 
arbitral peacemaking” that he labels “meditration.”86 The way the AU and other 
African regional organizations “mediate” unconstitutional changes of 
government seems to support this claim. Yet when formulating mandates and 
issuing communiqués, the AU and SADC still largely invoke an ideal of 
mediation that disregards these realities of international mediation. What may 
be needed is more transparency about the organizations’ own norms and 
principles and more honesty about the normative and practical dilemmas of 
attempting to actually mediate in the context of the AU’s anti-coup policy. The 
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organizations might then be perceived as more credible and legitimate 
mediators and more room might be created for real mediation and dialogue. 
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